

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGW-A-172

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: <sup>May</sup> 30 June 1949

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

TO : E J  
FROM : E J  
SUBJECT: Radio Nacional Propaganda Broadcasts.  
REF : 55-CWUHG and MGW-A-136.

This document is part of an integrated  
file. It separates from the file it must be  
subjected to individual systematic review.

1. Reference is made to the two above dispatches concerning the possibility of EDUCATOR supplying our Madrid office with background material for broadcasts to the Soviet Union and satellite areas over Radio Nacional.

2. Since receiving your dispatch, we have studied the matter not only in regard to the immediate problem of supplying background material but also relative to the larger, long range possibility of utilizing Radio Nacional as a channel for operational broadcasts, to which EDUCATOR creative personnel in Germany might contribute both program material as well as programs themselves, including possibly special recordings.

3. Information here indicates that Madrid is heard reasonably well in satellite areas, although I would like to have the benefit of any monitoring reports which you may have obtained on the subject. If the station does in fact reach satellite areas with reasonable satisfactory audibility and if the Spanish Government, through proper covert arrangements, is willing to place the facilities and broadcast time of the station at the disposal of E J, this would clearly open up the possibility of using Madrid as an operational outlet for broadcasts, either sponsored by or accordingly produced by the U.S. Government.

4. Assuming the broadcasts can be heard satisfactorily in the target areas and that time and facilities could be made available to E J, it would seem there are four major problems to be met:

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- a. Cover for the operation.
- b. Policy control.
- c. Type of broadcasts in relation to audience reaction.
- d. A competent production organization.

5. In regard to (a) above, through negotiations with the proper Spanish Government levels, I should think a suitable operational cover could be arranged—as, for example, the Spanish Government, in its desire to oppose religious persecutions in satellite countries, has accorded broadcasting time to refugee Catholic groups in Spain in order to permit them to talk to their fellow countrymen.

6. In regard to (b) above, periodic policy guidance from the home office, together with a close monitoring watch over the broadcasts, should provide adequate policy control, especially if the cover and security of the operation are well maintained and the U.S. Government is not linked in any way with the broadcasts.

7. In regard to (c) above, this might seem to be the most difficult problem to be met because of the necessity for announcing to listeners the place, origin and sponsorship of the programs. Listeners in satellite areas will know the programs are coming from Spain over Radio Nacional and of necessity are being supported by the Franco regime. The opposition may be expected to capitalize on this and denounce the programs as Fascist, reactionary church propaganda, organized by discredited refugees who have sold their services to Franco. Admittedly, therefore, this Franco-Fascist backing of the broadcasts might adversely affect listener reaction. On the otherhand, this possible adverse factor might be altogether offset if the "story" build up of the broadcasts were well developed, if the programs had a direct, sincere and authentic character and if regular program continuity were maintained. In general, it would seem that the best basic theme would necessarily have to be a Catholic one or at least have definite Catholic conotation and ~~especially~~ designed to influence Catholic elements in the target areas, especially in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

8. In regard to (d) above, with the Hungarian and Czech personnel now attached to EDUCATOR—or to be attached in the next two months—I feel we could make a definite contribution to the operation in either or both of the two following ways:

- a. By transmitting ~~monthly~~ to Madrid, newspapers, magazines and other raw background material for broadcasts. At a later date, when our staff capabilities permit it, this would be done on a selected, news clipping basis. In addition, it should be possible subsequently to add other languages.

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b. By preparing and transmitting to Madrid, programs, either in rough or finished form, for actual broadcasts. These might include occasional recordings of a special nature.

9. In my opinion, either or both of the two above services could be performed by us without materially burdening our other operations. In fact—and I presume you have carefully considered this angle—We may find in this possibility an effective operational outlet in the radio field for a considerable part of the creative capabilities of EDUCATOR.

10. Specifically, concerning 8(a) above, we can, within a relatively short time, begin transmitting to Madrid a steady flow of DP publications, selected magazines and newspapers from the press in Germany and Austria—all in the appropriate satellite languages. Later, when our indigenous production units are more fully staffed, this material could be sent down in the form of clippings, selected here on the basis of Madrid's special needs.

11. Specifically, concerning 8(b) above, I believe that by 1 July we could begin furnishing Madrid with rough or finished scrip for periodic broadcasts in Hungarian and, possibly in a more limited way, in Czech. We could also by that date include German, although I doubt that Germany would be regarded as a target for this operation. The frequency, time length and character of such scrips could be developed in subsequent communication interchange between EDUCATOR, the home office and Madrid. In making this suggestion, we assume, of course, that Madrid, on its part, will be staffed with a limited number of competent program direction and announcing personnel. Subsequently, if the operation is actually undertaken, I might succeed in developing a small creative staff of his own, capable of operating entirely independent of us or continuing in coordination with us.

12. The practical—and for all I know insurmountable—obstacle relating to (a) and (b) above (especially b), is the mailing time required to transmit material from our headquarters in Germany to

1. Since the mailing time required would be prohibitively long, we could not count on transmitting the material to the Washington home office for retransmission to Madrid. The only other official channel would be to utilize existing pouch channels between here and Madrid, and at this writing ~~I do not know these channels and~~ I do not know the nature and speed of these channels. An unofficial alternative would be to transmit the material by commercial air mail, using some form of cover to explain its origin in Germany and making arrangements with the Spanish Government to permit the material to pass freely through customs. In any case, if we could consistently reach Madrid within a week, I think the background material, as well as any actual program material which Madrid might desire, should be sufficiently fresh to be usable.

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13. The foregoing represents our present general views on the Madrid possibility, taking into consideration our limited knowledge of the actual situation there and the home office attitude. In all this, I am also aware of the higher policy implications involved in making any arrangements of this nature with the Franco regime.

14. Summing up, I would appreciate receiving your general reaction to this memorandum and specifically, a reply to the following questions:

a. Do you wish us to begin the regular transmission of background material to Madrid? If so, when should this be initiated and, in general, what should be the character of the material?

b. <sup>What</sup> What communication channel should we use in transmitting such material?

c. Should we, if even in a preliminary way, regard Radio Nacional as a potential operational outlet for EDUCATOR? If so, should we be giving thought to the planning of a broad program theme and actual broadcasts, either in rough or finished form?

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